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Abstract
It has been demonstrated that hidden represen-
tation learned by deep model can encode pri-
vate information of the input, hence can be ex-
ploited to recover such information with rea-
sonable accuracy. To address this issue, we
propose a novel approach called Differentially
Private Neural Representation (DPNR) to pre-
serve privacy of the extracted representation
from text. DPNR utilises Differential Privacy
(DP) to provide formal privacy guarantee. Fur-
ther, we show that masking words via dropout
can further enhance privacy. To maintain util-
ity of the learned representation, we integrate
DP-noisy representation into a robust training
process to derive a robust target model, which
also helps for model fairness over various
demographic variables. Experimental results
on benchmark datasets under various param-
eter settings demonstrate that DPNR largely
reduces privacy leakage without significantly
sacrificing the main task performance.
1 Introduction
Many language applications have involved deep
learning techniques to learn text representation
through neural models (Bengio et al., 2003;
Mikolov et al., 2013; Devlin et al., 2019), perform-
ing composition over the learned representation for
downstream tasks (Collobert et al., 2011; Socher
et al., 2013). However, the input text often pro-
vides sufficient clues to portray the author, such
as gender, age, and other important attributes. For
example, sentiment analysis tasks often have pri-
vacy implications for authors whose text is used
to train models. Many user attributes have been
shown to be easily detectable from online review
data, as used extensively in sentiment analysis re-
sults (Hovy et al., 2015; Potthast et al., 2017). Pri-
vate information can take the form of key phrases
explicitly contained in the text. However, it can
also be implicit. For example, demographic infor-
mation about the author of a text can be predicted
with above chance accuracy from linguistic cues in
the text itself (Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al., 2015).
On the other hand, even the learned representa-
tion, rather than the text itself, may still contain
sensitive information and incur significant privacy
leakage. One might argue that sensitive informa-
tion like gender, age, location and password should
not be leaked out and should have been removed
from representation. However, on the intermedi-
ate representation level, which is trained from the
input text to contain useful features for the pre-
diction task, it can meanwhile encode personal
information which might be exploited for adver-
sarial usages, especially a modern deep learning
model has vastly more capacity than they need to
perform well on their tasks. And, it has been justi-
fied that an attacker can recover private variables
with higher-than-chance accuracy, only using hid-
den representation (Li et al., 2018; Coavoux et al.,
2018). Therefore, the fact that representations ap-
pear to be abstract real-numbered vectors should
not be misconstrued as being safe.
The naive solution of removing protected at-
tributes is insufficient: other features may be highly
correlated with, and thus predictive of, the pro-
tected attributes (Pedreshi et al., 2008). To tackle
with these privacy issues, Li et al. (2018) proposed
to train deep models with adversarial learning,
which explicitly obscures individuals’ private infor-
mation, while improves the robustness and privacy
of neural representation in part-of-speech tagging
and sentiment analysis tasks. In a parallel study,
Coavoux et al. (2018) proposed defence methods
based on modifications of the training objective of
the main model. However, both works provide only
empirical improvements in privacy, without any for-
mal guarantees. Prior works have approached for-
mal differential privacy guarantee by training dif-
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ferentially private deep models (Abadi et al., 2016;
McMahan et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019). However,
these works generally only considered the training
data privacy rather than the test data privacy. While
cryptographic methods can be used for privacy pro-
tection, it could be resource-hungry or overly com-
plex for the user.
To alleviate the above limitations, we take inspi-
rations from differential privacy (Dwork and Roth,
2014) to provide formal privacy guarantee of the
extracted representation from user-authored text.
Meanwhile, we propose a robust training algorithm
to derive a robust target model to maintain utility,
which also offers fairness as a by-product. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the only work
to date that can provide formal differential privacy
guarantee of the extracted representation, while
ensuring fairness.
Our main contributions include:
• For the first time, the privacy of the extracted
neural representation from text is formally
quantified in the context of differential privacy.
A novel approach called Differentially Private
Neural Representation (DPNR) is proposed
to perturb the extracted representation.Also,
we prove that masking words via dropout can
further enhance privacy.
• To maintain utility, we propose a robust train-
ing algorithm that incorporates the noisy train-
ing representation in the training process to
derive a robust target model, which also re-
duces model discrimination in most cases.
• On benchmark datasets across various do-
mains and multiple tasks, we empirically
demonstrate that our approach yields compa-
rable accuracy to the non-private baseline on
the main task, while significantly outperforms
the non-private baseline and adversarial learn-
ing on the privacy task1.
2 Preliminary: Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (Dwork and Roth, 2014) pro-
vides a mathematically rigorous definition of pri-
vacy and has become a de facto standard for pri-
vacy analysis. Within DP framework, there are two
general settings: central DP (CDP) and local DP
(LDP).
In CDP, a trusted data curator answers queries or
releases differentially private models by using ran-
1code and preprocessed datasets are available at:
https://github.com/xlhex/dpnlp.git
domisation mechanisms (Dwork and Roth, 2014;
Abadi et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2019). For scenarios
where data are sourced from end users, and end
users do not trust any third parties, DP should be
enforced in a “local” manner to enable end users
to perturb their data before publication, which is
termed as LDP (Dwork and Roth, 2014; Duchi
et al., 2013). Compared with CDP, LDP offers a
stronger level of protection.
In our system, we aim to protect the test-phase
privacy of the extracted neural representations from
end users, we therefore adopt LDP. LDP has shown
the advantage that the data is randomised before
individuals disclose their personal information, so
the server and the middle eavesdropper can never
see or receive the raw data. In terms of LDP mecha-
nisms, randomised response (Warner, 1965; Duchi
et al., 2013) and its variants have been widely used
for aggregating statistics, such as frequency estima-
tion, heavy hitter estimation, etc (Erlingsson et al.,
2014).
Definition 2.1. Let A : D → O be a randomised
algorithm mapping a data entry in D to O. The
algorithm A is (, δ)-local differentially private
if for all data entries x,x′ ∈ D and all outputs
o ∈ O, we have
Pr{A(x) = o} ≤ exp() Pr{A(x′) = o}+ δ
If δ = 0, A is said to be -local differentially pri-
vate.
A formal definition of LDP is provided in Def-
inition 2.1, The privacy parameter  captures the
privacy loss consumed by the output of the algo-
rithm:  = 0 ensures perfect privacy in which the
output is independent of its input, while  → ∞
gives no privacy guarantee.
For every pair of adjacent inputs x and x′, dif-
ferential privacy requires that the distribution of
A(x) and A(x′) are “close” to each other where
closeness are measured by the privacy parameters
 and δ. Typically, the inputs x and x′ are adja-
cent inputs when all the attributes of one record
are modified. In real scenario, the adjacent input is
an application specific notion. For example, a sen-
tence is divided into several items for every 5 words,
and two sentences are considered to be adjacent if
they differ by at most 5 consecutive words (Wang
et al., 2018). In this work, we consider a word-level
DP, i.e., two inputs are considered to be adjacent
if they differ by at most 1 word. For brevity, we
use (, δ)-DP to represent (, δ)-LDP for the rest
of the paper. We remark that all the randomisa-
tion mechanisms used for CDP, including Laplace
mechanism and Gaussian mechanism (Dwork and
Roth, 2014), can be individually used by each party
to inject noise into local data to ensure LDP before
releasing (Lyu et al., 2020a; Yang et al., 2020; Lyu
et al., 2020b; Sun and Lyu, 2020). In particular,
we adopt Laplace Mechanism which ensures -DP
with δ = 0 throughout the paper.
In a nutshell, data universe can be expressed as
D = (X ,A,Y), which will be convenient to parti-
tion as (X ,Y)×A (Jagielski et al., 2018). Given
one person’s record x, we can write it as a pair
x = (xI ,xS) where xI ∈ (X ,Y) represents the
insensitive attributes and xS ∈ A represents the
sensitive attributes. Our main goal is to promise
differential privacy only with respect to the sensi-
tive attributes. Write xS ∼ x′S to denote that xS
and x′S differ in exactly one coordinate (i.e. one
word/token in NLP domain). An algorithm is (, δ)-
differentially private in the sensitive attributes if
for all xI ∈ (X ,Y) and for all xS ∼ x′S ∈ A and
for all O ⊆ O, we have:
P
[
M(xI ,xS) ∈ O
] ≤ e P [M(xI ,x′S) ∈ O]+δ
Post-processing. DP enjoys a well-known post-
processing property (Dwork and Roth, 2014): any
computation applied to the output of an (, δ)-DP
algorithm remains (, δ)-DP. This nice property al-
lows the attacker to implement any sophisticated
post-processing function on the privatised represen-
tation from the user, without compromising DP or
making it less differentially private.
3 Main Framework
3.1 Attack Scenario
As indicated in §1, uploading raw input or rep-
resentations to a server takes the risk of reveal-
ing sensitive information to the eavesdropper who
eavesdrops on the hidden representation and tries to
recover private information of the input text. Hence,
similar as Coavoux et al. (2018), we consider an
attack scenario during inference phase in Figure 1,
which consists of three parts: (i) a feature extrac-
tor to extract latent representation of any test in-
put x; (ii) a main classifier to predict the label y
from the extracted latent representation; (iii) and
an attacker (eavesdropper) who aims to infer some
private information z contained in x, from the la-
tent representation of x used by the main classifier.
In this scenario, each example consists of a triple
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Figure 1: Attack scenario during inference phase.
Train
Feature 
extractor
f
Test
𝑥"
𝑥# Differentially PrivateNeural RepresentationFeature extractor
f
Server
Side
User
Side
Test
result
Noise layer Classifier
C
Noise layer
Robust training of target model
f(𝑥")
f(𝑥#) f(𝑥#) + r
f(𝑥") + r
Figure 2: Illustration of the proposed main framework.
(x, y, z), where x is an input text, y is a single la-
bel (e.g. topic or sentiment), and z is a vector of
private information contained in x. Such attack
would occur in scenarios where the computation
of a neural network is shared across multiple de-
vices. For example, phone users send their learned
representations to the cloud for grammar correc-
tion or translation (Li et al., 2018), or to obtain the
classification result, e.g., the topic of the text or its
sentiment (Li et al., 2017).
3.2 Methodology
To defend against the middle eavesdropper, we aim
to design an approach that can preserve privacy
of the extracted test representation from the user
without significantly degrading the main task per-
formance. To achieve this goal, we introduce a DP
noise layer after a predefined feature extractor (de-
termined by the server), which results in differen-
tially private representation that can be transferred
to the server for classification (the topic of the text
or its sentiment), as shown in Figure 2.
In terms of model training on the server, theoreti-
cally, one could remove the noise layer and conduct
non-private training by following Equation 1:
L(x,y) = X (C(f(x)),y) (1)
where f is the feature extractor, C is the classifier,
y is the true label, and X denotes the cross entropy
loss function.
However, doing so may deteriorate test perfor-
mance, due to the injected noise in the test rep-
resentation. To improve model robustness to the
noisy representation, we put forward a robust train-
ing algorithm by incorporating a noise layer which
Algorithm 1 Robust Training on the Server
Input: Training record (xt,yt); Feature extractor f ; Clas-
sifier C.
1: Extraction: xr ← f(xt);
2: Normalization: xr ← xr − min(xr)/(max(xr) −
min(xr));
3: Perturbation: xˆr ← xr + r, ri ∼ Lap(b);
4: Calculate loss L = X (C(xˆr),yt) and do backpropaga-
tion to update f and C.
adds the same level of noise as the test phase in
the training process as well. Therefore, the robust
training objective can be re-written as:
L(x,y) = X (C(f(x)+ r),y) (2)
The detailed robust training process on the server
is given in Algorithm 1. After the robust target
model is built, server then provides a feature ex-
tractor f to the user, as illustrated in Figure 2.
3.3 Privacy Guarantee
Let f(x) = xr ∈ Rk be the extracted represen-
tation from x by feature extractor f , and to apply
-DP to the extracted neural representation, we in-
ject Laplace noise r to xr = f(x) as follows:
xˆr = xr + r ,
where the coordinates r = {r1, r2, · · · , rk} are
i.i.d. random variables drawn from the Laplace
distribution defined by Lap(b), where the noise
scale b = ∆f ,  is the privacy budget and ∆f is
the sensitivity of the extracted representation.
3.3.1 Formal Privacy Guarantee
Algorithm 2 outlines how to derive differentially
private neural representation from the feature ex-
tractor f . Each user first feeds its masked sensitive
record x˜s into a feature extractor to extract repre-
sentation xr ∈ Rk.
Note that to apply additive noise mechanism, the
sensitivity ∆ of the output representation xr =
f(x) needs to be determined. Estimating the true
sensitivity of xr is challenging. Instead, we fol-
low Shokri and Shmatikov (2015) to use input-
independent bounds by enforcing a [0,1] range on
the extracted representation, hence bounding the
sensitivity of each element of the extracted repre-
sentation with 1, i.e., ∆f = 1. Limiting the range
of the extracted representation can also improve
the training process by helping to avoid overfitting.
A formal statement for the privacy guarantees of
Algorithm 2 is provided in Theorem 1.
Algorithm 2 Differentially Private Neural Repre-
sentation (DPNR)
Input: Each sensitive record xs ∈ Rd; Feature extractor
f .
Parameters: Dropout vector In ∈ {0, 1}d;
1: Word Dropout: x˜s ← xs  In;
2: Extraction: xr ← f(x˜s);
3: Normalisation: xr ← xr − min(xr)/(max(xr) −
min(xr));
4: Perturbation: xˆr ← xr + r, ri ∼ Lap(b);
Output: Perturbed representation xˆr .
Theorem 1. Let the entries of the noise vector r
be drawn from Lap(b) with b = ∆f . Then Algo-
rithm 2 is -differentially private.
3.3.2 Word Dropout Enhances Privacy
In NLP, each input is a sequence composed of
words/tokens {w1, · · · , wd}. Under word-level DP,
two sentences are considered to be adjacent inputs
if they differ by at most 1 word (i.e., 1 edit distance).
In this scenario, to lower privacy budget without
significantly degrading the inference performance,
we borrow the idea of nullification (Wang et al.,
2018) and apply it to word dropout.
For each sensitive record xs, words are masked
by a dropout operation before DP perturbation.
Given a sensitive input xs that consists of d words,
dropout performs word-wise multiplication of xs
with In, i.e., x˜s ← xs  In, where In ∈ {0, 1}d.
In can be either specified by users to mask the
highly sensitive words or generated randomly. The
number of zeros in In is determined by d ·µ, where
µ is the dropout rate. The zeros are located in In
conforming to the uniform distribution.
As stated in Theorem 2, word dropout in combi-
nation with any -differentially private mechanism
provides a tighter privacy bound in the context of
word-level DP. A detailed proof follows.
Theorem 2. Given an input x ∈ D, suppose
A(x) = f(x) + r is -differentially private, let
In with dropout rate µ be applied to x, i.e., x˜ =
xIn, thenA(x˜) is ′-differentially private, where
′ = ln[(1− µ) exp() + µ].
Proof. Suppose there are two adjacent inputs x1
andx2 that differ only in the i-th coordinate (word),
say x1i = v, x2i 6= v. For arbitrary binary vector
In, after dropout, x˜1 = x1  In, x˜2 = x2  In,
there are two possible cases, i.e., Ini = 0, and
Ini = 1.
Case 1: Ini = 0. Since x1 and x2 differ only
in i-th coordinate, after dropout, x˜1i = x˜2i = 0,
hence x1  In = x2  In. It then follows
Pr{A(x1  In) = S} = Pr{A(x2  In) = S}.
Case 2: Ini = 1. Since x1 and x2 differ only
in the value of their i-th coordinate, after dropout,
x˜1i = x1i = v, x˜2i = x2i 6= v, hence x˜1 and x˜2
remain adjacent inputs that differ only in i-th coor-
dinate. Because A(x) is -differentially private, it
then follows
Pr{A(x1  In) = S} ≤ exp() Pr{A(x2  In) = S} .
Combine these two cases, and use the fact that
Pr[Ini = 0] = µ, we have:
Pr{A(x1  In) = S}
= µPr{A(x1  In) = S}+ (1− µ) Pr{A(x1  In) = S}
≤ µPr{A(x2  In) = S}+ (1− µ)[exp() Pr{A(x2  In) = S}
= [(1− µ) exp() + µ] Pr{A(x2  In) = S}
= exp{ln[(1− µ) exp() + µ]}Pr{A(x2  In) = S}
Therefore, after dropout, the privacy budget is
lowered to ′ = ln[(1− µ) exp() + µ].
Since the perturbed representation A(x) =
f(x) + r is -differentially private, combining
dropout beforehand, the privacy budget is lowered
to ′ = ln[(1 − µ) exp() + µ], hence improving
privacy guarantee. Apparently, a high value of µ
has a positive impact on the privacy but a potential
negative impact on the utility. In particular, when
µ = 1, all d words will be masked, which gives
the highest privacy, i.e., ′ = 0, but totally destroys
inference performance. Hence, a smaller value of
µ is preferred to trade off privacy and accuracy.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct comprehensive studies
over different tasks and datasets to examine the ef-
ficacy of the proposed algorithm from three facets:
1) main task performance, 2) privacy and 3) target
model fairness.
4.1 Task and Dataset
We use two natural language processing tasks: 1)
sentiment analysis and 2) topic classification, with
a range of benchmark datasets across various do-
mains. Table 1 summarises the statistics of the used
datasets.
4.1.1 Sentiment Analysis
Trustpilot Sentiment dataset (Hovy et al., 2015)
contains reviews associated with a sentiment score
on a five point scale, and each review is associated
with 3 attributes: gender, age and location, which
are self-reported by users. The original dataset
is comprised of reviews from different locations,
however in this paper, we only derive TP-US for our
study. Following Coavoux et al. (2018), we extract
examples containing information of both gender
and age, and treat them as the private information.
We categorise “age” into two groups: “under 34”
(U34) and “over 45” (O45).
4.1.2 Topic Classification
For topic classification, we focus on two genres of
documents: news articles and blog posts.
News article We use AG news corpus (Del Corso
et al., 2005). To ensure a fair comparison, we use
the corpus preprocessed by Coavoux et al. (2018)2.
And the task is to predict the topic label of the
document, with four different topics in total.
Regarding the private information in AG, named
entities appearing in text are vulnerable to privacy
leakage inferred by attackers. In order to simulate
the attack, we firstly adopt the NLTK NER system
(Bird et al., 2009) to recognise all “Person” enti-
ties in the corpus. Then we retain the five most
frequent person entities and use them as the private
information. Due to the sparsity of name entities,
each target entity only appears in very few articles.
Hence we select the examples containing at least
one of these named entities to mitigate the unbal-
ance and data scarcity. Thus, the attacker aims
to identify these five entities as five independent
binary classification tasks.
Blog posts We derive a blog posts dataset (BLOG)
from the blog authorship corpus presented (Schler
et al., 2006). However, the original dataset only
contains a collection of blog posts associated with
authors’ age and gender attributes but does not pro-
vide topic annotations. Thus we follow Coavoux
et al. (2018) to run the LDA algorithm (Blei et al.,
2003) with the topic number of 10 on the whole
collection to identify the topic label of each doc-
ument. Afterwards, we selected posts with single
dominating topic (> 80%) and discarded the rest,
which results in a dataset with 10 different topics.
Similar to TP-US, the private variables are com-
prised of the age and gender of the author. And the
age attribute is binned into two categories, “under
20” (U20) and “over 30” (O30).
2https://github.com/mcoavoux/pnet/
tree/master/datasets. We use both “title” and
“description” fields as the input document.
Dataset Private Variable #Train #Dev #Test
TP-US age, gender 22,142 2,767 2,767
AG entity 11,657 1,457 1,457
BLOG age, gender 7,098 887 887
Table 1: Summary of three pre-processed datasets.
 TP-US AG BLOG
NON-PRIV 85.53 78.75 97.07
DPNR
0.05 85.65 80.87 96.69
0.1 85.52 80.78 96.39
0.5 85.52 79.71 96.84
1 85.36 79.36 96.39
5 85.87 79.59 96.66
Table 2: Main task accuracy [%] of NON-PRIV and
DPNR over 3 datasets with varying  and fixed µ = 0.
For all three datasets, we randomly split the pre-
processed corpus into training, development and
test by 8:1:1.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Similar to Coavoux et al. (2018), we define senti-
ment analysis and topic classification as the main
tasks, whereas the inference of private informa-
tion is considered as the auxiliary tasks of attack-
ers. Each auxiliary task is eavesdropped by one
attacker.
We use accuracy to assess the performance for
both main tasks. The auxiliary tasks are evaluated
via the following metrics:
• For demographic variables (i.e., gender and
age): 1−X , where X is the average over the
accuracies of the prediction by the attacker on
these variables.
• For named entities: 1 − F , where F is the
F1 score between the ground truths and the
prediction by the attacker on the presence of
all named entities.
We denote the value of 1-X or 1-F as empirical
privacy, i.e., the inverse accuracy or F1 score of
the attacker, higher means better empirical privacy,
i.e., lower attack performance.
4.3 Model Selection
Model and Parameters. For implementation, ow-
ing to its success across multiple NLP tasks, we
apply BERT base (Devlin et al., 2019) to the clas-
sification tasks. Specially, BERT takes a text in-
put, then generates a representation which embeds
holistic information. We apply a dropout to this
representation before a softmax layer, which is re-
sponsible for label classification.We run 4 epochs
on the training set, and choose the checkpoint with
the best loss on the dev set.
After we obtain a well-trained target model, we
partition it into two parts, BERT model acts as the
feature extractor f in Figure 2, which could be
deployed on users’ devices, while the remaining
layers act as the classifier on the server. In our
implementation, privacy is enforced in the hidden
representation extracted by the feature extractor
as shown by Algorithm 2. For attack classifier,
we utilise a 2-layer MLP with 512 hidden units
and ReLU activation trained over the target model,
which delivers the best attack performance on the
dev set in our preliminary experiments.
We report the averaged results over 5 indepen-
dent runs for all experiments.
4.4 Performance Analysis of Target Model
Firstly, we would like to study how the privacy
parameters (, µ) in Theorem 1 and 2 affect the
accuracy of main tasks. We investigate this using
different parameter settings, varying one parameter
while fixing the other.
4.4.1 Impact of Privacy Budget 
To analyse the impact of different privacy budget
 on accuracy, we choose  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5}
with fixed µ = 0. Noted that to provide reasonable
privacy guarantee,  should be set below 10 (Hamm
et al., 2015; Abadi et al., 2016). Moreover,  ≤ 1
means a relatively tight privacy guarantee. Sur-
prisingly, there is no obvious relationship between
accuracy and . We speculate the denoising train-
ing procedure of BERT and layernorm (Ba et al.,
2016) make BERT resistant to the injected noises,
which can maintain the performance of the main
tasks. We will conduct an in-depth study on this in
the future.
Table 2 shows that in most cases, our method can
achieve comparable performance to the non-private
baseline, across all  even when the noise level is
high ( = 0.05), which validates the robustness of
our method to DP noise. It also implies that the DP-
noised representation not only preserves privacy,
but also retains general information for the main
task.
4.4.2 Impact of Dropout Rate µ
Similarly, we study how the word dropout rate µ
affects accuracy-privacy trade-off. Table 3 reports
µ TP-US AG BLOG
NON-PRIV 85.53 78.75 97.07
DPNR
0.1 85.53 80.71 96.05
0.3 84.85 79.18 93.76
0.5 83.51 77.42 90.98
0.8 80.70 69.57 82.94
Table 3: Main task accuracy [%] of NON-PRIV and
DPNR over 3 datasets with varying µ and fixed  = 1.
the performance of different models under differ-
ent µ ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8} with fixed  = 1. In
most cases, as µ becomes larger, accuracy starts to
degrade as expected. However, as indicated in The-
orem 2, higher µ results in better privacy as well.
Moreover, µ = 0.5 can still provide a relatively
high accuracy, while privacy budgets are reduced
to ′ = ln[(1− µ) exp() + µ] = 0.62.
Overall, both results demonstrate that our DPNR
can protect privacy of the extracted representations
of user-authored text, without significantly affect-
ing the main task performance.
4.5 Attack Model
Apart from formal privacy guarantee from DP, we
use the performance of the diagnostic classifier
of the attackers for empirical privacy. To fairly
compare with the standard training and adversarial
training in previous work (Coavoux et al., 2018),
we train an attack model that is trying to predict pri-
vate variables from the representation. We measure
the empirical privacy of a hidden representation
by the ability of an attacker to predict accurately
specific private information from it. If its empirical
privacy (c.f., Section 4.2) is low, then an eavesdrop-
per can easily recover information about the input.
In contrast, a higher empirical privacy (close to that
of a most-frequent label baseline) suggests that xr
mainly contains useful information for the main
task, while other private information is erased.
To study the relationship between DP and em-
pirical privacy, we numerically investigate the im-
pact of the different differential privacy budgets
on empirical privacy. Recall that the empirical
privacy is measured by 1-X/F , and the higher is
better. Figure 3 shows that with the increase of
the budget, empirical privacy across all datasets
demonstrate a decreasing trend, especially for AG,
which well aligns with DP where the higher value
of  implies lower formal privacy guarantee. Since
 = 0.05 provides the best privacy guarantee, we
Figure 3: Results of privacy protection over TP-US, AG
and BLOG datasets across different differential privacy
budgets. X-axis is the differential privacy budget ,
while Y-axis indicates the empirical privacy (see §4.2).
fix  = 0.05 and µ = 0 as a default setting in the
rest of this section, unless otherwise mentioned.
How private are the noisy neural represen-
tations? For empirical privacy, we investigate
whether our DPNR can provide better attack re-
sistance compared with the adversarial learning
(ADV) (Coavoux et al., 2018) and non-private train-
ing method (NON-PRIV), which indicates a lower
bound. We also report the majority class prediction
(MAJORITY) as an upper bound.
Table 4 shows that the attack model can indeed
recover private information with reasonable accu-
racy when targeting towards the non-private repre-
sentations, manifesting that representations inad-
vertently capture sensitive information about users,
apart from the useful information for the main task.
By contrast, our DPNR significantly reduces the
amount of information encoded in the extracted
representation, as validated by the substantially
higher empirical privacy than NON-PRIV across all
datasets. We also observe that our DPNR achieves
comparable empirical privacy to the majority class
(MAJORITY), and consistently outperforms the
adversarial learning (ADV) from Coavoux et al.
(2018), which confirms the argument of Elazar
and Goldberg (2018) that adversarial learning can
not fully remove sensitive demographic traits from
the data representations. Conversely, the post-
processing property of DP ensures that the privacy
loss of the extracted representation cannot be in-
creased even by the most sophisticated attacker.
This claim can be further confirmed by Table 5,
which reports the accuracy of the attacker on clas-
sifying whether a named entities is absent or pre-
TP-US AG BLOG
Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv.
MAJORITY 79.40 36.39 57.79 49.34 34.16 46.96
NON-PRIV 85.53 34.71 78.75 23.24 97.07 33.88
ADV -0.25 +0.67 -21.71 +26.43 -2.44 +1.16
DPNR +0.12 +3.66 +2.12 +31.13 -0.38 +15.86
Table 4: Results of the main task and the privacy-
protected task on the test sets over different datasets.
The relative values are based on NON-PRIV method and
bold indicates our DPNR achieves better performance
than other methods. (See §4.2 for details for metrics.)
Entity 3 Entity 4 Entity 5
A P A P A P
ratio [%] 82 18 90 10 91 9
NON-PRIV 96.71 81.99 99.43 47.20 96.93 68.29
ADV 98.57 39.71 100.00 0.00 99.87 12.96
DPNR 90.86 8.46 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Table 5: Accuracy of attack classifier on absence (A)
and presence (P) classification of 3 entities over AG.
sented in the document over AG3. Generally, both
ADV and DPNR can reduce attack accuracy, mis-
leading the attacker classifier to predict most of the
shared representations as majority (A). While our
DPNR significantly outperforms both NON-PRIV
and ADV, corroborating our analysis above.
4.6 Target Model Fairness
Recently, fairness concern has gained lots of atten-
tion in NLP community (Bolukbasi et al., 2016;
Zhao et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2019; Lu et al.,
2018; Sun et al., 2019). Depending on the litera-
ture, fairness can have different interpretation. In
this section, we further consider the relation be-
tween differential privacy and fairness. We ask
the research question whether differential privacy
noise can help enhance model fairness? We focus
on a particular scenario of fairness, that is given a
specific demographic variable (e.g. gender) a fair
model should deliver an equal or similar perfor-
mance over the subgroups (e.g. male vs. female)
(Rudinger et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2018).
To empirically evaluate the fairness, we take in-
spirations of Rudinger et al. (2018); Zhao et al.
(2018); Li et al. (2018) and partition the test data
into sub-groups by the demographic variables, i.e.,
age, gender and five person entities. Different
from predicting demographic variables in attacker
(§4.5), we measure the main task accuracy differ-
3For space limitation, we only report 3 of 5 entities and
the results of other two are similar.
Gender Age
F M U O
TP-US
ratio [%] 37 63 64 36
NON-PRIV 83.69 +1.57 84.63 +0.02
ADV. 84.95 +0.19 85.38 -0.46
DPNR 85.90 +0.49 86.08 +0.31
BLOG
ratio [%] 52 48 46 54
NON-PRIV 98.07 -2.18 97.05 -1.49
ADV. 93.84 -7.54 91.91 -3.57
DPNR 98.00 -2.34 97.09 -0.11
Table 6: The accuracy of main tasks among different
demographic groups (age and gender) on TP-US and
BLOG. “Ratio” means the ratio between two subgroups
of the demographic variable. The relative values (M
and O) of right subgroups are deviated from the left
subgroups (F and U) accordingly.
(a) NON-PRIV (b) DPNR
Figure 4: t-SNE plots of the extracted representations
over two age subgroups (U20 and O30) of BLOG using
NON-PRIV method and proposed DPNR.
ence among subgroups of demographic variables.
In fact, we noticed DPNR can also help mitigate
the bias in the representations with respect to the
specific demographic or identity attributes, such
that the decisions made by our robust target model
are able to improve the fairness among the con-
cerned demographic groups.
First of all, as the distribution of the demo-
graphic groups in TP-US and BLOG datasets is rela-
tively even, hence there is no significant deviation
on the main tasks (see Table 6). However, we still
observe an noticeable difference for the age group
in BLOG and the gender attribute in TP-US. To
help better understand the phenomenon, we per-
form further analysis by plotting the non-private
and differentially private representations of age
on BLOG in Figure 4. It can be clearly observed
that the patterns of two subgroups are much easier
to be distinguished in the non-private representa-
tions, while the differentially private representa-
tions mostly mix the representations of “under 20”
and “over 30”. We speculate that this is a conse-
Entity 3 Entity 4 Entity 5
A P A P A P
ratio [%] 82 18 90 10 91 9
NON-PRIV 82.67 -18.82 80.86 -15.44 80.22 -10.78
ADV. 48.92 +7.82 49.64 +6.67 49.43 +9.6
DPNR 83.60 -16.93 81.79 -12.22 81.04 -6.04
Table 7: The accuracy of main tasks among three name
entities on AG. A means when the entity is absence,
while P indicates the presence of that entity. The rel-
ative values are deviated from the subgroup A. bold
means a statistically significant (p<0.0001) fairness im-
provement.
quence of the regularising effect of DP.
Table 7 shows the fairness results on AG, where
we observe the entity distributions are skewed and
the prediction of the NON-PRIV model on the domi-
nant groups is significantly superior to the minority
groups, which causes a severe violation in terms
of the fairness. Even under such circumstance, our
DPNR method can mitigate this skewed bias, achiev-
ing more fair prediction than other baselines.
5 Discussion
Privacy and fairness are two emerging but impor-
tant areas in NLP community. Prior efforts predom-
inantly focus on either privacy or fairness (Li et al.,
2018; Coavoux et al., 2018; Rudinger et al., 2018;
Zhao et al., 2018; Lyu et al., 2020a), but there is
no systematic study on how privacy and fairness
are related. This work fills this gap, and discovers
the impact of differential privacy on model fairness.
We empirically show that privacy and fairness can
be simultaneously achieved through differential pri-
vacy.
We hope that this work highlights the need for
more research in the development of effective coun-
termeasures to defend against privacy leakage via
model representation and mitigate model bias in
a general sense, and not only specific to a particu-
lar attack. More generally, we hope that our work
spurs future interest into developing a better under-
standing of why differential privacy works.
Meanwhile, differential privacy may incur a re-
duction in the model’s accuracy. It is worthwhile
to explore how to get a better trade-off between
privacy, fairness and accuracy.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we take the first effort to build differ-
ential privacy into the extracted neural representa-
tion of text during inference phase. In particular,
we prove that masking the words in a sentence
via dropout can further enhance privacy. To main-
tain utility, we propose a novel robust training al-
gorithm that incorporates a noisy layer into the
training process to produce the noisy training rep-
resentation. Experimental results on benchmark
datasets across various tasks, and parameter set-
tings demonstrate that our approach ensures repre-
sentation privacy without significantly degrading
accuracy. Meanwhile, our DP method helps re-
duce the effects of model discrimination in most
cases, achieving better fairness than the non-private
baseline. Our work makes a first step towards un-
derstanding the connection between privacy and
fairness in NLP – which were previously thought
of as distinct classes. Moving forward, we believe
that our results justify a larger study on various
NLP applications and models, which will be our
immediate future work.
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